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How ‘responsible’ is Crown Casino?: 
What Crown employees say
Linda Hancock
ALFRED DEAkIN RESEARCH INSTITUTE, DEAkIN UNIVERSITY
AbstrAct
Codes of Conduct framed in terms of ‘responsible gambling’ have 
become the central plank of the state’s response to community demands 
for government action on gambling. But how ‘responsible’ are Australian 
casinos on their host responsibility and responsible gambling? As 
corporate large-scale, licensed premises, operating largely under industry 
self-regulated Responsible Gambling Codes of Conduct, how well are 
they regulated on responsible gambling and on their Codes? To whom 
are the venues responsible for Code implementation? What is meant by 
‘responsible gambling’? Who makes sure the regulatory system is effective?
In the context of profiling the Australian casino industry (comprising 13 
casinos with at least one in each state/territory), this research is based on 
a case study of the largest casino in Australia – Crown Casino. Crown has 
been chosen strategically for its claims to international best practice in 
responsible gambling and formal regulatory requirements that it operate 
to international benchmarks. ‘Responsible gambling’ is taken to encompass 
host responsibility, ‘duty of care’ to patrons and employees, and the public 
safety requirements of a casino. The size, scale and location of Crown 
Casino, and its central place within the Crown Limited’s international 
casino operations, set an expectation that it would comply with, or exceed, 
best practice in responsible gambling.
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This analysis draws on quantitative and qualitative data from 225 
interviews with Crown Casino employees. We report on ‘routine 
practices’ related to floor staff (or ‘coal-face’) workers’ understanding 
and implementation of the Crown Casino Responsible Gambling Code 
of Conduct; responsible service of alcohol under Liquor Licence and 
responsible gambling provisions; staff training; the safety of employees 
and patrons and some of the likely impacts of Crown Casino on the 
broader community. 
The findings point to a lack of staff awareness of even the limited number 
of ‘signs’ of problem gambling included in the Crown Code of Conduct, 
and a breakdown in enforcement of responsible gambling and responsible 
service of alcohol within the casino environment. 
The overall conclusion is one of both Operator and Regulatory failure on 
responsible gambling, as the shift in legislative purpose from the emphasis 
on promotion of tourism, economic development and employment 
to that of responsible gambling (from 2000 under the Bracks/Brumby 
government) is not reflected in operator or regulator approaches to 
responsible gambling. This is in large part a reflection of the inherent 
contradiction between providing gambling opportunities for profit in the 
context of ‘soft’ or ‘light-touch’ regulation of responsible gambling, and 
indicates the need to address systemic failures in social protection from 
foreseeable harms.
>linda.hancock@deak in.edu.au
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Acronyms 
ADRI Alfred Deakin Research Institute 
ACA Australasian Casino Association 
ATM Automated Teller Machine 
CMS Central Monitoring System 
EASG European Association for the Study of Gambling 
EGM Electronic Gaming Machines (slots, poker machines or pokies) 
LHMU Liquor Hospitality Miscellaneous Union 
NGR Net Gambling Revenue (player losses) 
PC Australian Productivity Commission 
RG Responsible Gambling 
RGF Responsible Gambling Fund 
RSA Responsible Service of Alcohol 
TAB Totalisator Agency Board 
TGC Tasmanian Gaming Commission 
VCGA Victorian Casino and Gambling Authority 
VCGR Victorian Commission for Gambling Regulation 
VLT Video Lottery Terminal (a term used mainly in North America and Canada 
to refer to gambling machines, EGMs, or SLOTS) 
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INTRODUCTION 
The Australian gambling industry comprises four main sectors: 
 electronic gaming machines (EGMs) in community settings in clubs and hotels 
(55% combined revenue);  
 casino gambling from Australia‘s 13 casinos (18%);  
 wagering (15%); and  
 lotteries, pools and keno (12%) (The Productivity Commission, 2010, p. 2.9).  
Figure 1 Gambling in Australia 
 
Note: a Productivity Commission calculations based on 2008-09 casino gaming expenditure and 
2007-08 revenue shares (Allen Consulting Group, 2009). b IbisWorld (2008). c Estimates 
are for 2007-08 (included in IbisWorld submission 178, 2008).  
Source: Productivity Commission (2010, p. 2.5). 
The 13 casinos in Australia account for a significant and growing proportion of gambling 
revenue – 18% of the $19 billion player losses nationally in 2008-09 – which is a bit less 
than what households spent on footwear and clothing and more than the amount spent on 
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alcohol)1. While gaming machines have continued to expand as a proportion of total 
gambling expenditure, increasing from 29% of gambling expenditure in 1987-88 to 52% 
in 1998-99 and to 55% in 2008-09 (Productivity Commission, 2009, p. 2.35; and 2010, p. 
2.9), the casinos‘ share of gambling losses has also risen – from 9% of revenue in 1986-
87 to 18% in 2008-09 of the $19 billion lost nationally. As Allen Consulting Group 
(2009, p. 5) point out: ‗The opening of 10 casinos was the key driver in expenditure 
growth over the period 1983-84 to 1997-98‘2. Real casino gaming expenditure increased 
from $78.5 million to $2.8 billion (an increase of 34.9%) between 1983-84 and 2005-06 
(Allen Consulting Group, 2009, p. 5).  
Casinos have grown under state governments‘ encouragement of their role in promoting 
tourism and providing entertainment infrastructure. But there has been scant systematic 
independent research on their impact or how they are operated with regard to responsible 
gambling. 
Public criticism of poker machines in localised clubs and hotels has tended to detract 
attention from casinos, which operate as tightly controlled corporate-run environments. 
Researchers have also typically been denied permission to conduct research inside casino 
gambling venues; with the result that little is known about how they actually operate and 
how well they are regulated. Significantly, what goes on inside casinos has been closed to 
public scrutiny and independent research. 
The focus on Responsible Gambling Codes of Conduct: Crown Casino 
In the Australian context, there is a dearth of research into how regulation works in 
practice (Victorian Auditor-General, 2010); and in particular, about casino responsible 
gambling operations and practices. This has limited our understanding of the nature of 
routine casino practices on responsible gambling; the effectiveness of government 
regulation and industry self-regulation; the adequacy of casino responsible gambling 
codes of conduct; and gambling operators‘ compliance with codes (whether mandatory or 
voluntary). Most importantly, this has detracted from our understanding of the impact of 
casino environments on responsible gambling in the context of enforcement of liquor 
licensing standards and the need to protect the safety of patrons, employees and the 
broader community.  
Similar to other legalised but potentially harmful ‗dangerous consumptions‘ like tobacco 
and alcohol, the legalisation of gambling is highly conditional. Compared with other 
businesses, or forms of ‗entertainment‘, it is important to recognise the additional 
accountabilities required of casinos and gambling venue operators – because of the 
known risk of harm from gambling products and the known risks associated with 
gambling in licensed premises. Gambling premises were previously banned by law and 
have only relatively recently been given highly conditional licences to operate. Their 
legalisation was premised on expectations that regulating a legalised gambling industry 
would assist in control of organised crime, scrutiny of money laundering and provision of 
limited, legalised forms of gambling with high standards of financial and operational 
probity and public protection from known harms. For this reason, it would be expected 
                                                 
1  Productivity Commission, 2010, p. 2.2. 
2 While the first casino Wrest Point Hotel Casino (Hobart) was opened in 1973, the larger casinos opened 
in the 1990s; with Crown Melbourne opening in 1994 and Star City Sydney in 1995 (Allen Consulting 
Group, 2009, p. 4) 
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that gambling operations would be subject to what in other less potentially harmful 
‗entertainment‘ industries might be seen as more invasive regulation. 
Internationally, casinos are often embedded within complex transnational corporate 
systems, identified with ‗dangerous consumptions‘ or ‗social harms products‘ (including 
alcohol, tobacco, fast food and gambling). In the Australian context, casinos combine 
gambling with food, liquor and other forms of entertainment, with some such as Crown 
Casino (Melbourne) and Sky City (Sydney) encompassing large-scale, city-based 
entertainment, conference centres and luxury shopping complexes, and offering a wide 
range of gambling products. 
These areas of state-licensed potential ‗social harms‘ such as alcohol, tobacco and 
gambling have in common a number of key characteristics:  
- They are dominated by large corporate vested interests with elaborate chains of 
supply and inter-locking, frequently transnational, commercial and political 
interests; 
- There is a proliferation of community access and encouragement of consumption 
of these products via industry advertising and promotion; 
- Industries such as alcohol and gambling have the backing of state/territory 
governments in terms of concessions and affirmation of their role in tourism 
promotion;  
- There exist asymmetries of knowledge between industry and the community, and 
industries like the gambling and alcohol industries that spend millions on research 
on how to increase consumption and what product features ‗work‘ in terms of 
market-segment targeting and revenue-generation; 
- Industry has a vested interest in normalising consumption (for example, the 
gambling industry claims gambling is recreational or ‗entertainment‘, thus 
diverting attention from the individual and societal costs of predictable gambling-
related harms (Hancock, 2010). 
Since the approval of casino operations in Victoria under the Casino Control Act 1991, 
government policy and the formal, legislative purpose of gambling have shifted from 
tourism, economic development and employment to responsible gambling. A key 
question is whether industry practices and government regulation of casinos adequately 
reflect this important change of purpose. 
This research is based on a case study of Crown Casino, Melbourne3. Crown has been 
chosen strategically for its claims to international best practice in responsible gambling 
(RG) and formal regulatory requirements that it operate to international benchmarks4. 
Location of Crown Casino complex on the Southbank entertainment precinct in close 
proximity to the central business district (Flinders Street and Spencer Street railway 
stations, the St Kilda Road Arts precinct, Federation Square and the new Melbourne 
Convention Centre), raises expectations that ease of public access to such a large venue 
                                                 
3 ‗Crown Limited operates the Melbourne Casino, as part of the Crown Entertainment Complex, on the 
south bank of the Yarra River at Melbourne, as authorised by a licence granted under and subject to the 
provisions of the Casino Control Act 1991 on 19 November 1993‘ (VCGA, 2000, p.1).  
4 ‗The Company must conduct its operations in the Melbourne Casino in a manner that has regard to the 
best operating practices in casinos of a similar size and nature to the Melbourne Casino‘. Amended by 
Clause 2.11 of the Ninth Variation Agreement to the Casino Agreement dated 8 July 2005 (VCGR, 2010). 
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necessitates vigilant regulatory oversight and high standards of internal operations on 
responsible gambling, responsible alcohol service and security.  
Crown Casino licence was granted to Crown Limited on 19 November 1993 when it 
entered into a 99-year lease for the Crown Entertainment Complex site. Crown Casino 
Melbourne is part of Crown Limited, a transnational corporation with operations in 
Australia, Macau, the UK and Canada (Crown Limited, 2009). With the completion of its 
third hotel with a further 658 rooms, Crown is now Australia‘s largest hotel with a total 
of 1600 rooms (Allen Consulting Group, 2009, p. 7). 
Crown operates under special regulatory conditions under state legislation and is subject 
to a mandatory but ‗free-form‘ Responsible Gambling Code of Conduct.  
Responsible Gambling Codes typically comprise a range of elements: 
(i) ‗signs‘ of problem gambling which trigger an operator response such as staff-
initiated interventions; 
(ii) the offer of self-exclusion, whereby patrons are offered the opportunity to sign 
a deed of exclusion with a venue operator (or whereby patrons may be 
excluded from a venue by the operator); and 
(iii) other provisions including advertising, information, referral for assistance and 
so on. 
The Crown Code of Conduct is designed by the operator and approved by the Regulator 
under general Ministerial Direction (Victorian Commission for Gambling Regulation 
(VCGR), 2009).  
Central to Crown‘s claims to responsible gambling, are the establishment of a 24-hour 
Responsible Gaming Support Centre (including access to psychologists and a Chaplaincy 
Service); responsible gambling information available at the gaming floor and entry 
points; a Play Safe Program that enables customers to set daily spend and time limits; a 
self-exclusion program (whereby players can enter into an agreement to be barred from 
the Casino) (now compulsory under Victorian law); compliance with prohibition on 
gambling by minors under 18 years of age; maintenance of the gambling environment 
(‗Customers will be encouraged to take regular breaks from gambling‘); and information 
on financial transactions, responsible advertising promotions and implementation and 
review of its Responsible Gambling Code of Conduct. Crown states that: 
Crown is committed to providing and promoting gaming in a responsible manner. 
Numerous responsible gaming initiatives have been introduced over time, these 
include: 
*  The establishment of a Responsible Gaming Support Centre, open 24 hours, 7 
days per week and staffed by Responsible Gaming Liaison Officers, Responsible 
Gaming Psychologists and a Chaplaincy Service. All services are provided free 
of charge. 
*  Responsible gaming information available at many locations throughout the 
gaming floor and at Casino entry points. 
*  A Play Safe Program that allows Crown gaming machine customers to set daily 
individual spend and time limits (or a combination thereof) using their Crown 
Signature Club Card.  
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The Crown Responsible Gaming Support Centre provides a number of free and 
confidential services and is conveniently located on Level B1 directly below the 
main gaming floor food court.‘ (Crown Melbourne Limited, 2010). 
http://www.crowncasino.com.au/responsible-gaming) 
Underpinning the Code is the ‗informed choice‘ model of individual responsibility based 
on rational choice; information and education to inform the individual‘s choice to gamble 
and its ‗Stay In Control‘ slogan. 
While the decision to gamble lies with the individual and represents a choice based 
on an individual‘s circumstances, we recognise that to make that choice 
responsibly, our customers need to be informed about our gaming products and 
information regarding the services and support available to them should they need 
or seek help with their gambling (David Courtney, in Crown Melbourne Limited, 
2010, p. 1). 
Delfabbro et al. (2007, p. 165) refer to the importance of examining the extent to which 
principles in codes of practice are ‗put into practice‘. Early surveys of responsible 
gambling codes and practices indicated low standards of compliance and scope for 
improvement (Hing 2001; Hing and Dickerson 2002) as did other studies (Breen, 
Bultjens & Hing, 2003; Hing, 2004; Delfabbro & Panozzo, 2004). In their study of 
Sydney clubs, ‗An Assessment of Member Awareness, Perceived Adequacy and 
Perceived Effectiveness of Responsible Gambling Strategies in Sydney Clubs (2002-03)‘, 
Hing and Dickerson found:  
some clubs appeared to not comply with some legal obligations in responsible 
gambling, specifically relating to allowing minors and intoxicated people in 
gambling areas. Yet, these are measures that respondents considered very important 
in encouraging responsible gambling (reported in Hing, 2009, p. 9.). 
Recent research has contributed to expectations that codes of conduct will encompass the 
‗signs‘ of problem gambling (or risk thereof), which venues might then use proactively to 
inform staff-initiated actions related to host responsibility and duty of care. Research 
points to the need to train staff to recognise the ‗signs‘ of problem gambling, on the basis 
that people may need proactive staff-initiated contact for a ‗reality-check‘ (Delfabbro, 
Osborn et al., 2007). 
It is therefore fitting to examine an important aspect of the regulatory process and 
question how well, in the case of Crown Casino, actual practices with regard to Codes of 
Conduct, stack up against industry claims to best practice and Regulators‘ assessments of 
compliance. 
Shifts in the Legislative Context of Responsible Gambling 
Australian gambling regulation is largely a state jurisdictional matter, although there is 
potential for the Commonwealth to step in to regulate consumer protection and product 
safety and a uniform National Code (explored in Hancock and O‘Neill, 2010). Under 
Australia‘s current federal division of responsibilities, all states and territories in 
Australia have specific gambling legislation establishing state-level gambling licensing 
and regulation. In addition, Commonwealth national laws prevail in the areas of the 
Trade Practices Act (1974), the Privacy Act (1988), the Proceeds of Crime Act (2002), 
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the Corporations Act (2001) and the Anti-Money Laundering and Counter-Terrorism Act 
(2006) (Allen Consulting Group 2009, p. 53). 
Government oversight of responsible gambling and harm minimisation occurs principally 
via state/territory level legislation, and regulation. Gambling codes of practice are 
regulated separately by each of the seven states and territories and there is currently no 
national code.  
While some states have formally mandated codes of responsible gambling practice in 
legislation (South Australia, ACT and Northern Territory), Victoria, Tasmania, Western 
Australia and New South Wales operate under voluntary industry codes that are not 
subject to legislation (Delfabbro and LeCouteur, 2006, p. 165). Victoria lies somewhere 
in the middle. It has mandated codes, which are constructed by each of the industry 
sectors (clubs, hotels, Crown Casino and the Victorian gaming machines industry) and 
approved according to general Ministerial Directives. Whether mandatory or voluntary, 
codes of conduct for gambling venues in Australia have become an important part of 
regulatory approaches to harm reduction/minimisation and ‗responsible gambling‘. 
In the State of Victoria, where Crown Casino has enjoyed exclusive licensing up until 
now, Crown is licensed to operate at its current Southbank site until 2033. Gambling is 
governed by four key sets of legislation — the Gambling Legislation Amendment 
(Problem Gambling and Other Measures) Act 2007 which amended the Gambling 
Regulation Act 2003, the Gaming Machine Control Act 1991, the Casino Control Act 
1991 and the Casino (Management Agreement) Act 1993 (with nine amendments up to 
2009). The Acts set up the expectation ‗that gambling activities should be conducted in a 
manner so as to ―minimise the harms caused by problem gambling‖ and to 
―accommodate those who gamble without harming themselves or others‖‘ (Delfabbro, 
Osborn et al., 2007, p. 54). 
Recent legislative reforms in Victoria clearly prioritise responsible gambling as the key 
purpose underpinning both legislation and regulation on gambling. In reference to Box 
2.2, the following legal responsibilities of Crown Casino and the Regulator need to be 
emphasised: 
 Crown‘s obligation to perform to international benchmarks on best practice in ‗the 
use of technology in business, training and development of staff, operational 
excellence‘ (the Casino (Management Agreement) Act 1993 as amended in 2000); 
 The shift in primary legislative purpose of casino regulation from promotion of 
tourism, employment and economic development to ‗fostering responsible 
gambling in casinos‘ (with the Gambling Legislation (Responsible Gambling) Act 
2000);  
 The shift in government policy to ‗public health and social regulation models to 
address gambling-related harm‘ (from 2006 under the State Government‘s Taking 
Action on Problem Gambling Strategy 2006–2012); 
 Industry codes of conduct and the self-exclusion program mandatory in Victoria 
(from 2007) and the 2007 amendments to the Casino Control Act 1991 which 
expand the grounds for Regulatory disciplinary action to include ‗repeated 
breaches by the casino operator of the casino operator‘s Responsible Gambling 
Code of Conduct‘; and  
 A new ‗offence for a casino operator to knowingly allow an intoxicated person to 
gamble in the casino‘ (from 2007). 
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BOX 1 SHIFTS IN VICTORIAN LEGISLATION AND REPORTING 
1993 Act 
as 
amended 
‗Crown has specific obligations to maintain the Southbank 
Complex as a high quality, international class casino complex’ 
(VCGA, 2000, p. 15) 
‗The benchmarking study sought to provide a realistic and appropriate 
basis against which to determine whether Crown is complying with 
its various obligations in relation to world class standards. A 
particular objective was to assess, on a factual level, the standards of 
the best international casinos in the world‘ (VCGA, 2000, p. 16). 
 
Crown’s obligation to ‘maintain a world-class casino complex’ 
‘Crown Melbourne is obliged by the Casino Agreement and the 
Casino (Management Agreement) Act 1993 to maintain a world-class 
casino complex. Those obligations include cleaning the complex to a 
high standard, a capital asset replacement and upgrade program, 
maintaining a world-class operation in the use of technology in 
business, training and development of staff, operational excellence, 
responsible gambling and the responsible serving of alcohol‘ (VCGR, 
2009b, p. 14). 
 
2000 Gambling Legislation (Responsible Gambling) Act 2000 
Shift in primary legislative purpose of casino regulation from 
tourism, employment and economic development to ‗fostering 
responsible gambling in casinos‘  
 
Previous primary purpose of enforcement of gambling legislation 
changed from promoting tourism, employment and economic 
development generally in the State, to ‗substituting the fostering of 
responsible gambling in casinos in order to minimise harm caused by 
problem gambling‘. (Gambling Legislation (Responsible Gambling) 
Act 2000)5. 
 
‗While the Casino Control Act still has an economic purpose, the 
amendments make it clear that the Authority no longer has a 
responsibility to manage its licensing systems for an economic 
purpose.‘ June 2000 Second Triennial Review of Casino Operator and 
Licence (VCGA, 2000, p. 7)6. 
                                                 
5 ‗The changes to the Casino Control Act were: 
• to cap the number of electronic gaming machines at 2,500; 
• in respect of one of the Authority‘s objects – the maintenance and administration 
of systems for the licensing, supervision and control of casinos – to remove an existing purpose – 
promoting tourism, employment and economic development generally in the State – and substituting the 
fostering of responsible gambling in casinos in order to minimise harm caused by problem gambling and 
accommodate those who gamble without harming themselves or others. 
Promoting tourism, employment and economic development generally in the State remained one of the 
purposes – as set out in section 1(c) – of the Casino Control Act‘ (VCGA, 2000, p. 6). 
6 The Authority noted that ‗a general examination of economic impact‘ would be relevant but the clear 
intention of the changes to the Act is to prioritise responsible gambling (VCGA 2000, p. 7). 
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2006 Taking Action on Problem Gambling Strategy (2006–2012)7 ‗The 
legislative and administrative framework accepts gambling as a valid 
activity but also promotes responsible gambling, supports problem 
gamblers and requires the industry to have the highest standards of 
probity.‘….. 
 
‗a comprehensive, multifaceted strategy drawing on public health and 
social regulation models to address gambling-related harm‘. 
(Victorian Auditor General‘s Report 2010, p. vii). 
 
2007 Codes of Conduct made mandatory for Victorian gambling 
venues 
The industry codes of conduct and the self-exclusion program were 
voluntary under the original strategy. In 2007 they were made 
mandatory. Under the Gambling Legislation Amendment (Problem 
Gambling and Other Measures) Act 2007, the Casino Control Act 
1991 was amended ‗to require a casino operator to have a Responsible 
Gambling Code of Conduct‘ Section 1, Purposes, (b)(i). Such codes 
must be in place no later than June 1 2009. 
 
2007 amendments to the Casino Control Act 1991 expanded the 
grounds for disciplinary action to include ‗repeated breaches by the 
casino operator of the casino operator‘s Responsible Gambling Code 
of Conduct‘8. 
 
 
                                                 
7 ‗The strategy identifies seven priority action areas: 
• building better treatment services 
• ensuring a more socially responsible gambling industry 
• promoting healthy communities 
• protecting vulnerable communities 
• improving consumer protection 
• enhancing the regulator 
• fostering gambling research (Victorian Auditor-General, 2010, p. 7). 
The five-year Taking action on problem gambling strategy (the strategy) for 2006–07 to 
2010–11 aims to: 
• reduce the level of problem gambling 
• minimise the harm associated with problem gambling 
• create and maintain a gaming environment that encourages responsible gambling and discourages 
behaviours associated with problem gambling (Victorian Auditor-General, 2010, p. 10). 
8 This can be found at: ‗55 Cancellation, suspension or variation of casino licence, amending section 20(1) 
of the Casino Control Act 1991, in the definition of grounds for disciplinary action, and inserting after 
paragraph (da), ―(db) that there have been repeated breaches by the casino operator of the casino operator's 
Responsible Gambling Code of Conduct;‖ (Government of Victoria, 2007, p. 41). The amending Act also 
specified these insertions as follows: Disciplinary action against venue operator  
In section 3.4.25(1) of the Gambling Regulation Act 2003, in the definition of grounds for disciplinary 
action, after paragraph (f) insert—  
―(g) that there have been repeated breaches by the venue operator of the operator‘s self-exclusion program;  
(h) that there have been repeated breaches by the venue operator of the operator‘s Responsible Gambling 
Code of Conduct;‖. 
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2007   Operator onus not to allow an intoxicated person to gamble 
Under the Gambling Legislation Amendment (Problem Gambling and 
Other Measures) Act 2007 as part of their five-year strategy to tackle 
problem gambling: Taking Action on Problem Gambling. The Casino 
Control Act 1991 was amended make it ‗an offence for a casino 
operator to knowingly allow an intoxicated person to gamble in the 
casino‘ (Government of Victoria, 2007, Section 1, Purposes, (b) (iv)). 
 
2009  New State Government taxation arrangements locked in until 
2032, increase in table games and poker tables for Crown Casino 
and re-definition of automated roulette machines as table games 
The Casino Legislation Amendment Bill 2009 (‗the Bill‘) amends the 
Casino Control Act 1991 and the Casino (Management Agreement) 
Act 1993 by changing provisions in the taxation arrangement between 
the State of Victoria and Crown Melbourne Limited (Macreadie 2009, 
p. 1) 
2010 Release of Auditor General’s report: Taking Action on Problem 
Gambling 
The audit examined whether the strategy was based on sound 
evidence and research; whether the Department of Justice (DOJ) and 
the independent regulator, the Victorian Commission for Gambling 
Regulation (VCGR), are implementing the strategy as intended; and 
whether there is reasonable assurance that initiatives are achieving their 
objectives (Victorian Auditor-General, 2010, p. vii). 
 
The Auditor-General‘s report concluded: 
 ‗there was little or no evidence to suggest the initiatives 
examined in this audit would be effective 
 (DOJ) performance management and reporting system lacks 
essential elements and cannot provide progressive assessment of the 
strategy‘ (Victorian Auditor-General, 2010, p. viii).  
 
These shifts in policy and discourse raise a number of Key Research Questions: 
- Does current practice by both operator and regulators reflect the shift in legislative 
purpose from promotion of tourism, employment and economic development 
generally in the state, to ‗substituting the fostering of responsible gambling in 
casinos in order to minimise harm caused by problem gambling‘? 
- Does Crown Casino‘s Responsible Gambling Code of Conduct match 
international benchmarks? 
- Is Crown Casino‘s enforcement of responsible gambling up to world-class 
standard? 
- Does Crown Casino‘s Code of Conduct and its enforcement adequately reflect the 
2007 reforms prohibiting operators from allowing an intoxicated person to 
gamble?  
- Is Crown Casinos‘ performance on responsible gambling and its Code of Conduct 
adequately enforced by the Regulator (VCGR)? 
- What actions have been taken in relation to enforcement of Liquor Licensing? 
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METHODOLOGY 
The analysis draws on quantitative and qualitative data from 225 interviews with Crown 
Casino employees, interviewed privately by telephone in their own time, via third-party 
interviewers (trained research call centre interviewers) to protect their privacy9. The 
sample was selected by quota sampling ton ensure adequate representation from 
employees with an interface with gamblers. All of the staff interviewed were members of 
the Liquor and Hospitality Miscellaneous Union (LHMU).  
Going direct to employees bypasses the barriers that beset research into the 
implementation and effectiveness of casino routine gambling responsible gambling (RG) 
practices when operators tend to act as gatekeepers and censors of the research 
environment. Casino employees were interviewed privately in their own time, rather than 
at the workplace. In addition some employees consented to attend three focus groups (for 
gaming machine attendants, bar/food/beverage workers, and security), which enabled 
further exploration of key themes raised in interviews.  
We examine reported ‗routine practices‘ on responsible gambling (RG) and responsible 
service of alcohol (RSA) and related issues of training in responsible gambling and 
responsible service of alcohol; and the safety of employees, patrons and the wider public.  
The research questions reported below spanned a range of workplace issues: awareness 
and practice of Crown Code of Practice and its implementation; practices related to 
responsible gambling and responsible serving of liquor; staff interactions with problem 
gamblers; the impact of shift work (including rotations into smoking precincts and work 
breaks); training issues (formal and in-house – Crown is an accredited training provider); 
staff leisure patterns; perceptions of regulation, security and management practices; and 
staff perceptions of safety issues.  
Since the enforcement of Codes of Conduct falls to the Regulator (VCGR10), two sub-
studies analyse (i) the type and outcome of the Gambling Regulator‘s hearings of casino 
regulatory breaches and (ii) the Regulator‘s benchmarking of Crown Casino‘s 
performance in its periodic licence reviews and our assessment of how current practices 
stack up against other recognised international casino best practice in The Netherlands, 
Switzerland, Canada and New Zealand. This is followed by an assessment of regulatory 
responses on Liquor Licensing matters and analysis of the numerous wide-ranging 
concessions granted to Crown Casino, such as exemptions on ATM and gambling 
machine reforms. 
The interview schedule administered to Crown Casino staff in the sample of 225 covered 
the following question areas: 
(iv) Demographics: sex, age, country of birth, main language spoken at home, 
marital status;  
(v) Work-related descriptors: job title, work status (full-time, part-time, casual 
etc), section of Crown Casino, start and finish time of main shift, whether 
                                                 
9 Under guidelines approved by Deakin University Ethics Committee HEAG 00/93. 
10 The Victorian Commission for Gambling Regulation (VCGR) ‗is responsible for regulating all forms of 
legalised gambling in the State of Victoria in accordance with the objectives and provisions of the 
Gambling Regulation Act 2003, the Casino Control Act 1991 and the Casino (Management Agreement) 
Act 1993‘. 
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working a split shift, whether working a rotating roster, whether rotation 
involves work in a smoking area; 
(vi) Responsible gambling and responsible service of alcohol: staff identification 
of Crown Code ‗signs‘ as signs of problem gambling, what staff routinely do if 
they see a customer having problems with their gambling, staff response to 
items related to workplace practices, staff perceptions of responsible service of 
alcohol; 
(vii) Crown employee’s leisure patterns and own gambling patterns (not included 
in this report); 
(viii)  Staff perceptions of safety at work: feelings of safety at work, the reliability 
of safety measures, staff attitudes to customers who are abusive/cut off from 
alcohol, whether staff feel under pressure to keep patrons gambling or drinking 
alcohol, staff perceptions on whether intoxicated patrons or evicted patrons are 
a danger outside the venue;  
(ix) Training (Crown is an accredited trainer): whether employees have formal 
qualifications in Responsible Gambling or Responsible Service of Alcohol, 
duration and frequency of responsible gambling training, frequency of 
responsible service of alcohol training, other gaming industry venue 
experience, what training staff would find useful. 
(x) Availability for a follow-up focus group. 
The Casino Employee Sample  
The sample comprised 225 Crown Casino employees. As shown in table 3.1 below, 
approximately two-thirds were male; about two-thirds (66.4%) were aged under 35 years; 
60.5% had never married; about two-thirds were born in Australia (63.6%); English is the 
main language spoken at home for 74.5% of the interviewees; about half (51.6%) work at 
Crown Casino permanent part-time, 39.6% work full time and 8.9% are casual 
employees. 
TABLE 1 CROWN CASINO EMPLOYEE SAMPLE (N=225) 
Sex 68.4% Male  
31.6% female 
Age 41.4% aged 18-24 
25.0% aged 25-34 
18.2% aged 35-44 years 11.8% aged 45-54 years      
3.6% aged 55 years or older 
Marital status 60.5% never married  
36.3% either married or living with a partner;  
3.2 % divorced or separated 
Country of birth 63.6% born in Australia 
14.1% born in Asia 
18.2% born in mainly non-English speaking countries 
Main language spoken at 
home 
74.5% speak English 
6.8% speak Chinese 
3.2% speak Vietnamese  
13.6% speak a variety of languages other than English 
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Work status at Crown 
Casino 
51.6% permanent part-time 
39.6% full time  
8.9% casual  
Shift commences 28.9% Midnight (midnight to 6am) 
9.6% Morning (7am to midday) 
25.7% Afternoon (midday to 6pm) 
35.8% Evening (7pm to midnight) 
*Split shift  8.7% Yes 
91.3% No 
*Rotating roster  80.7% Yes 
19.3% No 
*Roster rotates into 
smoking areas  
33.9% Yes 
66.1% No 
Note: * Split shift refers to one working shift which is split between two times within one day; 
rotating roster refers to the practice of monthly or otherwise rotations of some staff to 
work different shift times; roster rotations into smoking areas refers to the practice of 
requiring some staff to work on some shifts in areas of the casino (high roller rooms) 
where exemptions to the state-wide smoking ban have been granted. 
In terms of their practical interface with gambling, the majority of those interviewed 
work on the main gambling floor (85.3% as dealers, waiters, bar attendants, gaming area 
security, gaming machine attendants, keno, gaming promotions and cashier/cage area), 
with a good representation of respondents from other areas of Crown including the 
Teakroom/Riverside; Mahogany/East End; high roller precinct; security; the Signature 
club; Crystal Club; Crown Towers 32nd floor; level 1 Café Corso; West end and the 
nightclubs/Lumina. 
Most (94.1%) have only ever worked in a casino; 6.8% had worked in a hotel gaming 
venue; 3.2% in a TAB outlet and 3.6% in a club gaming venue and 1.8% at a racetrack. 
The respondents work across all shifts and most (91.3%) do not work a split shift. The 
majority (80.7%) work a rotating roster and for about one-third, (33.9%) of respondents, 
their roster rotates into smoking areas. 
Key Findings 
The Crown Casino Responsible Gambling Code of Conduct 
Compared with a range of other international jurisdictions, the Responsible Gambling 
Crown Code of Conduct, which has been approved by the Regulator according to 
Ministerial Directions, includes only a minimal list of ‗signs‘ of problem gambling (nine) 
compared with 29 across casinos in The Netherlands, 20 in Switzerland, and 32 in the 
New Zealand Sky City Auckland Problem Gambler Identification Policy.  
Crown staff show disappointing recognition of even these 9 Crown Code of 
Conduct signs of problem gambling. It is these ‗signs‘ that are intended to trigger 
staff reports to supervisors. 
Low awareness levels of problem gambling signs by staff 
- 55.6 % ‗communicating very little with anyone else‘  
- 59.3 % ‗continuing to gamble with the proceeds of large wins‘  
- 61.2% ‗avoiding contact with others while gambling‘ 
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Mid-level awareness  
- 72.9% ‗barely reacting to events going on around them‘ 
- 76.2% ‗gambling every day‘ 
- 80.8% ‗gambling for extended periods without a break‘ 
 
Higher level awareness  
-  89.3% ‗displaying aggressive, antisocial or emotional behaviour while gambling‘ 
- 92.5% ‗finding it difficult to stop gambling‘   
- 92.5% ‗making requests to borrow money from staff or other customers‘. 
 
Consistent with the research literature on the ability of gaming venue staff to identify 
problem gambling behaviours (Delfabbro, Osborn et al., 2007; Delfabbro, 2008), almost 
70% (69.1%) of casino staff in this study said they ‗find it easy to identify who the 
problem gamblers are‘ (and an additional 13.5% were unsure). 
 As one staff member said: ‗we all know who they are, it’s as plain as day’. 
- It’s a sensitive issue, and the person could become a bit violent and angry and it’s 
not my role to have to deal with that. 
- It is none of my business to stop and tell people they have a problem. 
I'm afraid of losing my job. The casino doesn’t like it when you stop people from 
giving over their money. 
 
With 24-hour venues, patrons are often reluctant to leave the gaming area and urination 
on stools and in the gaming area was a theme in focus groups. 
 ...They sit at the machines, they won’t get off their ass and get a drink, they won’t 
even go to the toilet.  They will sit there and just wee, go to the toilet at the 
machine.   
 At the machine, they will pull down their pants and they’ll go. Do whatever they 
feel like. 
 They are worried because if they go, the machine will be gone and they are the 
ones that are playing that machine... 
 They put all their money in that machine and they are scared that somebody else 
will get free turns... 
 “They’ve actually gone and done number two’s as well... 
 ...in the middle of the floor, near Margot’s. One of the girls was pushing the 
trolley along and all of a sudden you get this smell and it’s all over the wheels of 
her trolley, just riding along the floor. 
 YEAH. She was nearly sick. 
They work long hours and observe what is going on. 
The ‗upward report-to-supervisor‘ process is ambiguous and results in low rates of floor 
staff interventions in problem gambling – because they are told not to intervene. 
 65.3% of casino employee interviewees say they do not advise customers to 
take regular breaks in play;  
 55.3% say they would not intervene when customers are in a distressed state 
while they are playing; and 
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 81.2% say they do not approach people whom they think are having problems 
with their gambling. 
It is clear that ‗upward referral‘ to a manager/supervisor may not meet the immediate 
needs of patrons in terms of patrons who are showing signs of risk or harm and where 
floor staff are there on the spot and in a good position to initiate preventative warnings or 
advice. 
Floor staff report overwhelmingly they are instructed not to intervene themselves, but are 
required to refer such cases to a supervisor/manager. On the other, there are informal 
rules which mean the Code is not widely understood or rigorously enforced, and it is 
ambiguous. 
Tellingly, just under one-third of staff (30.6%) would ‗feel more confident‘ if they had 
more training in responsible gambling. 
Self-Exclusion as a central plank in Crown’s Responsible Gambling policy 
Venue provision of the option of player self-exclusion is mandatory under Victorian 
Codes of Conduct11. In Victoria, from December 2008 it has been a condition of a venue 
operator‘s licence to have a self-exclusion program12. Self-exclusion programs are now 
compulsory for all venue operators and venue operators must have their self-exclusion 
programs approved by the Victorian Commission for Gambling Regulation (VCGR) from 
1 June 2009. 
As stated in the Crown Melbourne Ltd Code (2010, p. 5): 
In addition to observing its existing legislative requirements regarding Exclusion 
orders, Crown has a Self-Exclusion Program. Self-Exclusion is a process available 
to customers to ban themselves from the Casino. This may be an option useful to 
those customers who may be experiencing difficulties as a result of their gambling 
behaviours. 
Crown‘s program is promoted as ‗A Self-Exclusion Program for customers that 
encourages applicants to seek counseling and assistance‘ (Crown Melbourne Ltd 2010, p. 
6), but there is nothing in the Code on how staff interventions to intercept self-excluded 
patrons should be operationalised. With a venue as large as Crown Casino, with multiple 
entrances and exits, there is profound doubt as to how detection can work accurately from 
over 2000 photographs. (This is a problem with all ambient gambling venues.) A similar 
finding was made in Hing‘s case study of a large club where: 
There was also much scepticism about effective monitoring for breaches of self-
exclusion, given the number of self-exclusions (reportedly in the hundreds), the 
                                                 
11 Self-exclusion needs to be distinguished from Self-Exclusion Program under Section 3 of the Gambling 
Legislation Amendment (Problem Gambling and Other Measures) Act 2007 (Government of Victoria, 
2007, p. 4). 
‘self-excluded person means a person who has voluntarily excluded himself or herself from a gaming 
machine area under a self-exclusion program; 
self-exclusion program means a program that— 
 (a) enables a person to voluntarily exclude himself or herself from a gaming machine area; and 
 (b) enables the venue operator to prohibit such a person from that area;’. 
12 See 
http://www.fahcsia.gov.au/SA/GAMBLINGDRUGS/PUBS/NATIONALSNAPSHOTHARMMINIMISAT
ION/Pages/GamblingEnvironment.aspx 
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small passport-size photos, their unavailability to floor staff, and their location in a 
folder in the security office (Hing, 2009, p. 9).  
This points to the potential benefits of electronic (card swipe) or photo ID entry to such 
premises or card-based (or other universal ID) access to gambling.  
As the VCGR Third Triennial Review of Crown Casino found (2003, p. 18), there were 
1,165 breaches where excluded person entered the casino contrary to their Exclusion 
Orders (an average of 1.06 per day). In the Fourth and most recent Review (VCGR 2008, 
p. 19) there were 2,199 persons excluded from entering the casino and 2,328 breaches 
(averaging 1.27 per day – an increase of 0.21 per day on the previous review).  
The difficulties experienced by venues in general with regard to photo identification of 
self-excluded patrons are magnified with the size of a venue such as Crown – with over 
2000 patrons on formal exclusion agreements. Crown employees also drew attention to 
the difficulties associated with enforcing self-exclusion policies. 
 We don’t really have access to a lot of the up to date information that’s kept for the 
surveillance I suppose, from a security point of view, silly isn’t it. 
 Well, we used to. The system changed.  We used to have all those photos in our muster 
room. 
 No, we used to have...all these tables would be stacked with books, folders, thousands of 
photos, you would be said to just go and have a look at all the Asian like surnames, right. 
Asian with a white shirt and black hair, and hangs around this pit, right, it would just be 
the names. And all of a sudden they took all that away... 
 Because they said for privacy you are not allowed to have that around, even though it 
assists us with doing our job, but it’s an invasion of privacy for the people in the 
photographs and their behaviour. 
Responsible Service of Alcohol 
Crown is a mega casino and entertainment complex styled on the Las Vegas/Macau 
model and provides many opportunities for customers to combine liquor with gambling. 
The Crown Code of Conduct clearly includes a commitment to the Responsible Service 
of Alcohol (RSA) (Crown Melbourne Limited, 2010 p. 17). 
Moreover, as previously noted, state legislation makes it ‗an offence for a gaming venue 
operator or casino operator and wagering licence holders to knowingly allow a person to 
gamble while intoxicated‘ (Government of Victoria 2007). 
Similar to the procedure of upward reporting to supervisors in the case of problem 
gambling interventions, the upward referral system is also common in regard to reporting 
intoxication – with the added complication that pit bosses may not have the appropriate 
RSA training and may experience difficulties identifying intoxication. Staff may be 
fearful of patrons‘ reactions to being cut off (denied sale of alcohol) they may experience 
difficulties in screening for alcohol at multiple walk-in entry points; and clients‘ 
consumption of alcohol prior to entry into the casino makes it difficult for bar staff to 
gauge alcohol consumption. As well, the size of Crown and number of bars and alcohol 
outlets makes it difficult to ‗know the customer‘ and ensure that cut-off patrons will not 
be served with alcohol somewhere else within the complex.  
On the matter of ‗safety‘ from the perspective of casino staff, intoxication of patrons on 
the premises, combined with entry of large groups of young men who bar-hop and move 
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around the casino, pose safety issues for patrons and staff. A prominent example is the 
Fevola case when Crown Casino was fined $3,000 and new provisions were introduced to 
apply to specified sports days13.  
Crown Casino staff show high levels of reported awareness and compliance on RSA and 
high levels of awareness of the need for enforced removal from gambling areas of patrons 
who are intoxicated. But at the same time, they show low levels of their own reported 
interventions and a lack of attention to the staff role in avoidance of patron intoxication.  
With regard to the ban on gambling whilst intoxicated, about half (47.8% of staff) say 
they DO NOT approach people to stop gambling when they appear intoxicated. Some 
don‘t see the point of telling supervisors because of the lack of effective response and 
refer to managers turning a ‗blind eye‘ to intoxication. A number questioned the worth of 
informing supervisors – when little eventuated as a result.  
Crown Casino staff report a lack of enforcement of RSA and give numerous accounts of 
the difficulties of enforcing liquor-licensing provisions. Some say the casino is too big for 
bar staff to possibly keep track of how much individual patrons are drinking; others note 
the conflict between RSA and the role of tipping in encouraging inappropriate service of 
alcohol when patrons have clearly had enough. Others allude to revenue targets on bars, 
which have to be achieved before they close (sometimes extending time open) and the 
conflicts staff face in VIP gaming rooms that serve complimentary alcohol. 
- 18.6% of staff say RSA is not practised. 
- About 10% (9.6%) of staff felt ‗under pressure by management to keep people 
drinking (alcohol)‘. As one respondent said: ‗Although individual gaming staff 
attempt to implement RSA strategies, Crown’s overall business at making money, 
especially within food and beverage dept, undermines this’. 
- Staff alluded to the direct conflict between the focus on maximising revenue from 
gambling and cutting off (from alcohol) someone who is gambling whilst 
intoxicated, ‗when there’s the money going’.  
(Re people who are intoxicated – focus groups confirmed these themes) 
Oh, they fall off...they get drunk, sit at the machines, go to sleep, fall off the 
chairs, split their heads open... 
Fall down in the middle of the staircase... 
My old housemate spent 48 hours here completely smashed and they didn’t throw 
him out. My old housemate’s sick of his mates, all they did was just gamble for 48 
hours, completely hammered, and these boys can drink, and they just kept getting 
brought drinks. 
They are going to be a lot more lenient on how drunk they are before they stop 
them from playing. You get all the money you can before they eventually tell 
them... 
(Re keeping people drinking linked to making budget) 
For the bosses, for supervisors, it’s just the managers and managers in Food and 
Bev, if they make budget and they exceed budget, they will generally get a pay rise 
within the next KPO and they are done every six months.  So therefore if they can 
                                                 
13 See Silvester, and Hunter (2010) 
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keep people there, they are going to make budget, they are going to get a pay 
rises, they are going to get paid more money and they will be happier at the end of 
the day.  So that’s why a lot of them will just go yeah, ok, whatever. Or you will 
go to them ‗oh yeah, I‘ll watch over it‘. And they won’t do a thing. 
- Staff reported bar revenue targets can determine bar closing times, which means 
they sometimes stay open for more extended periods of time in order to achieve 
revenue targets. Some staff recommended ‗dry‘ spells or a ban on sale of alcohol 
after a particular time. 
- In some cases, bar revenue targets or incentive pay for bar supervisors may run 
counter to responsible service of liquor and thus cause a conflict of interest. 
- Many staff expressed reservations about the maintenance of RSA standards, about 
not cutting patrons off earlier and some said they feel intimidated by the 
behaviour or attitude of patrons whose level of intoxication really merits earlier 
‗cutting off‘ from sale of liquor. 
- Staff described a range of issues including people being admitted to the Casino 
when already intoxicated; the difficulties of monitoring patron alcohol intake 
because of ‗migration‘ into the Casino from other bars or from restaurants and 
‗bar-hopping‘ within Crown. 
The same requirement of an upward ‗report-to-supervisor‘ prevails for RSA as for 
responsible gambling, and similarly staff are put off reporting intoxication by the lack of 
action by those to whom they report. They talk of managers ‗turning a blind eye‘ to 
intoxication. This raises the issue of compliance with liquor licensing laws and 
regulations and related safety issues when intoxicated patrons are exited from the casino 
into the neighbouring bar and club precinct. 
Safety Issues 
Crown has been in the media for the high volume of calls to emergency services (Rolfe, 
2009) where official ambulance data obtained under freedom of information revealed 
there were 881 calls for emergency services at Crown Casino between August 2007 and 
August 2009, for 149 different reasons14. Staff alluded to attempts by Crown to keep 
statistics on emergency services down, for example, by putting patrons or staff into taxis 
as an alternative. There are concerns about security issues both within the venue and in 
relation to the impact of intoxicated patrons on the local city-fringe vicinity. 
R1-The two times I’ve had to go to the hospital from Crown, I’ve been given cab 
charges to go to the hospital and from the hospital home. I’ve been given cab 
charges for the lot. They won’t call the ambulance, they put me in a cab. I’ll get 
someone to escort me down to staff entry, taxi will be called, they’ll put me in the 
taxi, see ya later. I remember one …But they stuck me in a cab rather than call me 
a taxi, and I’d [injured myself].  But they stuck me in a taxi. 
 (Probe: Do you think they are worried about statistics?) 
 Yep. Guarantee it. 
The thing is they are not showing it anymore, right, that’s what I have to laugh at. 
With the ambulance report that came out, I am sitting here going three fights, 
yeah, bullshit.   
 (laughter) 
                                                 
14 ‗Among call-outs were overdoses, sex assaults, gun and knife fights, a drowning and several emergencies 
for pregnant women‘ (Rolfe, 2009). 
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keep people there, they are going to make budget, they are going to get a pay 
rises, they are going to get paid more money and they will be happier at the end of 
the day.  So that’s why a lot of them will just go yeah, ok, whatever. Or you will 
go to them ‗oh yeah, I‘ll watch over it‘. And they won’t do a thing. 
- Staff reported bar revenue targets can determine bar closing times, which means 
they sometimes stay open for more extended periods of time in order to achieve 
revenue targets. Some staff recommended ‗dry‘ spells or a ban on sale of alcohol 
after a particular time. 
- In some cases, bar revenue targets or incentive pay for bar supervisors may run 
counter to responsible service of liquor and thus cause a conflict of interest. 
- Many staff expressed reservations about the maintenance of RSA standards, about 
not cutting patrons off earlier and some said they feel intimidated by the 
behaviour or attitude of patrons whose level of intoxication really merits earlier 
‗cutting off‘ from sale of liquor. 
- Staff described a range of issues including people being admitted to the Casino 
when already intoxicated; the difficulties of monitoring patron alcohol intake 
because of ‗migration‘ into the Casino from other bars or from restaurants and 
‗bar-hopping‘ within Crown. 
The same requirement of an upward ‗report-to-supervisor‘ prevails for RSA as for 
responsible gambling, and similarly staff are put off reporting intoxication by the lack of 
action by those to whom they report. They talk of managers ‗turning a blind eye‘ to 
intoxication. This raises the issue of compliance with liquor licensing laws and 
regulations and related safety issues when intoxicated patrons are exited from the casino 
into the neighbouring bar and club precinct. 
Safety Issues 
Crown has been in the media for the high volume of calls to emergency services (Rolfe, 
2009) where official ambulance data obtained under freedom of information revealed 
there were 881 calls for emergency services at Crown Casino between August 2007 and 
August 2009, for 149 different reasons14. Staff alluded to attempts by Crown to keep 
statistics on emergency services down, for example, by putting patrons or staff into taxis 
as an alternative. There are concerns about security issues both within the venue and in 
relation to the impact of intoxicated patrons on the local city-fringe vicinity. 
R1-The two times I’ve had to go to the hospital from Crown, I’ve been given cab 
charges to go to the hospital and from the hospital home. I’ve been given cab 
charges for the lot. They won’t call the ambulance, they put me in a cab. I’ll get 
someone to escort me down to staff entry, taxi will be called, they’ll put me in the 
taxi, see ya later. I remember one …But they stuck me in a cab rather than call me 
a taxi, and I’d [injured myself].  But they stuck me in a taxi. 
 (Probe: Do you think they are worried about statistics?) 
 Yep. Guarantee it. 
The thing is they are not showing it anymore, right, that’s what I have to laugh at. 
With the ambulance report that came out, I am sitting here going three fights, 
yeah, bullshit.   
 (laughter) 
                                                 
14 ‗Among call-outs were overdoses, sex assaults, gun and knife fights, a drowning and several emergencies 
for pregnant women‘ (Rolfe, 2009). 
 
 That might be in 10 minutes in one bar. 
Ah, one stabbing, yeah what, with only a knife, what about bottles. I keep reading 
that report and seriously it was a load of crap because I know working there we 
have more than three fights. But maybe only three fights, if like you were pointing 
out to me, maybe only three fights that ambulances came for... 
The majority of staff (92.9%) believe there are ‗reliable security measures in place to 
protect employees‘ but at the same time, a significant number think there are safety and 
staffing number issues that need to be addressed. 
20.9% do not ‗always feel safe at work‘ and further probing on safety issues raises 
important issues: instances where alcohol and/or gambling losses make staff feel uneasy; 
or where they feel that staffing cuts have reduced the number of gaming and security staff 
on the floor at any one time. It is partly concerns about security that leads about one-third 
of Crown staff (32.3%) to say ‗Crown doesn‘t always treat me with respect‘. 
About 57% ‗feel uneasy when customers are abusive to the point they need to be 
removed from the venue‘.  
Staff are concerned about the amount of violence that is alcohol-related and about the 
level of intoxication, and the implications for their own and patrons‘ safety. They are 
concerned about the impact of rosters and staffing levels on the capacity of security staff 
to respond in a timely and effective manner. 
 If you were to put a number on, how many, on average, fights a night would you 
reckon there would be? 
 R1 - Which end of the casino, or the whole casino? 
 (Probe: Across the whole casino?) 
 Whole casino, cross wide... 
 R2 - Well there is at least five in the pub every night. 
 R3 - I would say roughly guessing about 10. 
 R4 - No, there’d be more than that. 
 R1 - No, there’s more than that. At least 30 or 40 fights a night. That’s the thing... 
 You just don’t hear about them. 
….I know most of the security guards I talk to that do night shifts at least do six, 
seven, eight escorts out of the building and a lot of them are due to fights. So if 
each security guard’s doing six or seven escorts, say there’s three or four of them 
doing escorts, that’s at least 20, 30 or 40 people a night that are being escorted 
out and the majority of them are all fights. 
Staff are concerned about the impact of intoxicated aggressive patrons on the surrounding 
community when, for example, patrons are ‗cut off‘ from alcohol (ie denied sale of 
alcohol) and are exited from the casino premises.  
- 74.5% said: ‗Customers who have been evicted from the venue could be a hazard 
to people outside the venue‘ 
- 66.2% agreed: ‗I sometimes worry intoxicated patrons evicted from my venue 
may be a danger to people outside the venue‘. 
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These responses raise serious questions about whether patrons are allowed to drink to a 
level of intoxication that precipitates violent or threatening behaviour meriting escort 
from the premises – which then impacts outside the Casino. Whether this then transfers 
problems generated at the Casino onto surrounding areas (CBD and nightclubs which are 
subsequently associated with violence) or into the community is at issue. 
Staff are critical of the ‗all comers‘ entrance policy and suggested (even though some 
customers are refused entry) the need for more screening of patrons and a required dress 
code. Some staff have questioned whether the tone of Crown is inappropriate for a casino 
(whereas other standards may prevail in hotels and clubs, they argue a casino should have 
higher standards and that this affects ‗the tone‘ of the venue as an ‗entertainment 
complex‘). 
Training 
This area has bearing on Crown Casino‘s role as an accredited internal training provider. 
At the aggregate level, 80% had completed the Responsible Conduct of Gambling (RSG) 
and 96% had completed the Responsible Service of Alcohol (RSA) Certificate; but not 
necessarily both.  
Training in responsible gambling is central to its enforcement. The previous finding on 
low levels of staff awareness of even the meagre list of problem gambling ‗signs‘ in the 
Responsible Gambling Crown Code of Conduct raises questions about the adequacy of 
in-house training. Significantly, 25% of supervisors and 50% of managers (admittedly 
small in number) reported they had never received training in responsible gambling. 
Almost one-fifth (18.9%) of gaming employees had only undertaken RG training once. 
This is in stark contrast to the Swiss Social Concept where staff training is longer and 
focuses on training staff to observe ‗troubled play‘; with supervisors and administrators 
attending longer training. In Swiss casinos: 
Staff training is conducted by addictions professionals. Orientation for new 
employees includes four hours on problem gambling. After 90 days on the job 
employees attend a two-day seminar dealing with processes for observing players. 
They watch videos and become involved in role-playing. They are also trained to 
use written forms for observing troubled play. Supervisors and administrators 
attend a longer, four-day seminar which concentrates on communications with 
guests and co-workers. All employees attend annual refresher courses (Thompson, 
2008, n.p.). 
There is also the issue of cross-training between gaming and food/beverage staff; 53.3% 
of food and beverage staff reported no training in responsible gambling (presumably 
central to knowledge of the Responsible Gambling Code of Practice and its enforcement). 
Given food and beverage staff‘s frequent interaction with gamblers at tables and 
machines, this raises a significant legitimacy gap in regard to enforcement of the RG 
Code of conduct and may go some way towards explaining the relatively low levels of 
knowledge of the code signs discussed previously.  
With regard to RG enforcement, almost one-fifth (17.6%) agreed they ‗sometimes feel 
under pressure by management to keep people gambling‘ and almost one-third agreed 
they ‗would feel more confident in my job if I had more training in responsible 
gambling‘.  
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As indicated by casino staff responses, questions might be raised about the thoroughness 
and probity of training and Crown‘s role as an accredited training agent. Staff reported 
some perfunctory approaches to training focused on compliance rather than a thorough 
process of learning. 
You go and ask how many food and bev attendants actually did their RSA 
refresher. Actually ask them how many did it. And then you go, so who did do it. 
The majority of our managers do RSA refreshers. Oh (Name) you need to do your 
refresher. Ok, I’ll do it. What’s your ID number, what’s your date of birth, so you 
hand over your date of birth, next thing you have got a piece of paper telling you 
have done the refresher and you are going cool. Awesome. 
Staff expressed a clear need for more training on crucial aspects of responsible gambling, 
with high numbers of staff saying they want more training: 
- 79.7% want ‗extra training for staff on the effects of problem gambling‘; 
- 83.9% want ‗regular responsible gambling refresher courses‘; 
- 74.9% want ‗training focused on how to help staff with gambling problems‘; 
- 66.4% want ‗training that involves local counselling services‘; 
- 79.6% want ‗clearer guidance on my responsibility to cut off (stop from drinking 
patrons who are gambling while intoxicated‘; and 
- 75.8% want to be provided with ‗more information to assess if customers have a 
problem‘. 
These results on staff training needs substantiate the findings of the Victorian Auditor-
General report (2010, p. 21), which found that: ‗VCGR [The Regulator] cannot 
effectively enforce codes of conduct or self-exclusion programs because of difficulties in 
auditing compliance. There is no quality assurance process for responsible gambling 
training courses‘. 
This research focuses on two further analyses (briefly summarised here).  
(i) Regulatory hearings of breaches of casino regulations by the Victorian 
Commission for Gambling Regulation (VCGR).  
The formal role of the regulator the Victorian Commission for Gambling Regulation 
(VCGR) is described by the Victorian Auditor General (2010, p. 7): 
VCGR was established in July 2004. It is a statutory authority under the Gambling 
Regulation Act 2003 and reports to the Minister for Gaming. It is responsible for 
the regulation of gambling, including in relation to EGMs [electronic gaming 
machines], and its functions include: 
• regulating the operation and use of EGMs 
• detecting offences committed in, or in relation to, approved gaming venues and 
the casino 
• receiving and investigating complaints from patrons concerning the conduct of 
gaming in approved venues and the casino 
• ensuring that all taxes, charges and levies are paid 
• advising the Minister for Gaming on community concerns about the economic and 
social impact of gambling on the wellbeing of the community. 
INSTITUTE
N
RESEARCH
DEAKI
ALFRED 
28 ALFRED DEAKIN RESEARCH INSTITUTE WORKING PAPER SERIES
 
The Regulator (VCGR) is responsible for ‗auditing venue compliance with harm 
minimisation and responsible gambling strategies such as codes of conduct, self-
exclusion programs, bet limits, and limitations on ATMs (Victorian Auditor 
General, 2010, p. 22). 
Between 2004 and June 2010, there have been 25 hearings on 38 matters heard by the 
Victorian Commission for Gambling Regulation as breaches of the Casino Control Act 
1991. As shown in the table below, collated from hearings reported by the Regulator, the 
vast majority of these have concerned Section 85 (37% of matters), which prohibits the 
entry of minors into the casino, and Section 60 (39% of matters), which states that a 
person must not conduct a game in a casino unless the game is conducted in accordance 
with the approved rules for the game. 
The Victorian gambling Regulator‘s (VCGR) triennial but now five-yearly reviews of 
Crown Casino have used international benchmarking, but have chosen liberal gambling 
regimes mainly from Macau and North America (in particular, Las Vegas) as 
comparators, rather than jurisdictions with more rigorous adherence to the principles of 
responsible gambling.  
Liquor Licensing enforcement by Responsible Alcohol Victoria (Department of Justice) 
was not able to supply data requested on its activities at Crown Casino15 and responded:  
As a general rule we would not discuss the details you have requested. This is 
because it is between us and the licensee. The only matters that can be discussed are 
those on public record. In this case that would only be the enforceable undertaking 
or anything else on the web (personal communication between author and Manager 
Compliance Directorate, 6 October 2010). 
In terms of published outcomes, the Compliance Directorate of Responsible Alcohol 
Victoria has only brought one formal action against Crown Casino, but regards 
transparency of reporting on monitoring and any other actions as a private matter between 
the Licensee (Crown Melbourne) and the Compliance Directorate. Of 2,650 inspections 
conducted state-wide in 2010/11, there were 650 breaches identified with approximately 
150 relating to the grounds ‗supply liquor other than in accordance with licence‘ between 
1 July 2010 and 31 August 2010 (Responsible Alcohol Victoria, 2010a, p. 1). There were 
26,500 inspections conducted in the year 2009-10 as at June 30 2010 and over 15,200 
breaches, but there is no further indication of how many may have concerned the Crown 
Casino licence (Responsible Alcohol Victoria, 2010b). It is therefore not possible to fully 
gauge the adequacy of enforcement of the provision that forbids an operator to allow an 
intoxicated person to gamble in a Victorian casino.  
                                                 
15 On October 1 2010, the author requested the following information relating to the last year (or relevant 
period) from the Compliance Directorate of Responsible Alcohol Victoria, on: 
 - the number of inspections related to liquor licensing enforcement at Crown 
 - the number of liquor licence-related breaches over whatever time frame best relates to the last 12–24 
months 
 - the nature of any breaches ie matters involved 
 - the nature of any sanctions 
 - the outcomes of any hearings or determinations related to breaches 
 - the dates and outcomes of any liquor licence-related hearings in the magistrates or other courts or 
VCAT 
 - any other information/research which is relevant to the above. 
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(ii) Scrutiny of the Regulator’s assessment of Crown’s reporting against national 
and international benchmarking undertaken by the Regulator. 
Victorian responsible gambling practices are contrasted with internationally recognised 
casino best practice comparators – The Netherlands, Switzerland, Saskatchewan and New 
Zealand – on casino host responsibility and duty of care and the ‗signs‘ or indicators of 
problem gambling that trigger protective venue staff interventions.  
Canada has advanced this technology and the Saskatchewan Gaming Corporation has 
implemented player protection intervention strategies based on player tracking systems 
(usually associated with player loyalty clubs) with interventions for identified problem 
and ‘at risk’ players (see Davies, 2007; Schellinck and Schrans, 2007; Techlink, 2009).  
The Saskatchewan Gaming Corporation was driven to examine the use of loyalty data for 
protective player interventions after its insurers threatened withdrawal of cover. Given 
management‘s access to data on real-time gambling patterns of its patrons in two casinos 
in the player loyalty club data central monitoring system (CMS), casino management 
sought to protect itself from possible liability in negligence by investigating how such 
data could be used to develop player algorithms which point to a range of potential 
problem gambling groups that merit protective interventions. Canadian researchers argue 
such data give casino operators knowledge of players‘ ‗frequency of visits, gambling 
losses and duration of play‘ (Sasso and Kalajdzic, 2006, pp. 562-566); which are proxies 
for problem gambling. 
In terms of the capacity to track player behaviour at Crown Casino and implement 
Canadian-style protective interventions, it is appropriate to mention that over a decade 
ago it was established that ‗the technology in place at the casino to support security and 
surveillance activities is highly advanced‘ (as recognised by the Victorian Auditor-
General‘s Office, 1998 at 6.40). Crown loyalty data was to be subject to research by the 
Gambling Research Panel in its 2003 Research Plan (and under previous, now revoked 
legislation, Crown was to submit its loyalty data for research use by the now-abolished 
independent Gambling Research Panel). But with the abolition of the Panel, such 
research has not been undertaken by an independent agency. However, the type of data 
collected and what it can tell operators in terms of signalling problem gambling is now 
well established; and other jurisdictions recognise the potential implications for operator 
insurance public liability risk. 
At the regulatory level, New Zealand represents a best practice comparator on proactive 
government regulation on the content and monitoring of mandatory codes of practice in 
casinos. In terms of best practice in RG regulation, the New Zealand Gambling Act 2003 
(sections 308–312) imposes specific requirements on gambling providers in relation to 
identifying problem gamblers.  
This model needs to be adopted for Australian casinos as part of international 
benchmarking and duty of care under casino licensing. 
Both Crown and the regulators seem to be overly focused on adherence to process rather 
than demonstrated outcomes on matters related to responsible gambling.  
Similar to the Productivity Commission final report on gambling (2010) and the report of 
the Victorian Auditor General (2010), the research findings raise questions about the 
conditions of casino operators‘ ‗licence to operate‘ and the lack of Regulatory audit and 
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monitoring of ‗host responsibility‘, responsible gambling, operator performance on their 
Responsible Gambling Code of Conduct and responsible service of alcohol.  
It raises further concerns about the merit and integrity of concessions granted to Victorian 
casinos, in this case Crown Casino, including: 
- The peppercorn rent paid under the Crown agreement ($1 per year for the first 40 
years of a 99-year lease over the five-hectare site) – in the context of the need for 
a proper review of the quantum of tax paid by the Crown Casino;  
- Gambling tax concessions granted to Crown Casino;  
- Increase by stealth in the number of gaming tables and the re-definition of ‗table 
games‘ to include automated multiple terminal gaming machines (effectively 
gaming machines);  
- Foreshadowed agreement to increase the floor area ‗footprint‘ of the casino – 
potentially embracing the new Crown hotel tower; concessions on ‗high roller‘ 
tax;  
- Exemption from the four-hour compulsory shut-down of gambling venues 
allowing continued 24 hour opening liquor licensing;  
- Exemption of some casino areas from state-wide smoking bans in gambling 
venues; concessions on ATM restrictions in gaming venues aimed at curbing 
problem gamblers from making withdrawals whilst they are in ‗the zone‘;  
- Exemptions for the casino under ‗responsible gambling‘ gaming machine reforms 
applied to all other Victorian venues (for machines in restricted areas – 
approximately one fifth of the 2,500 machines at Crown Casino);  
- Special rules for cash-out of gambling payouts at the casino; concessions related 
to Crown‘s past capital works undertakings;  
- Capitulation to the casino‘s interests by the Regulator in its regular reviews of the 
casino which use selective international comparisons which overlook other 
jurisdictions that meet world best practice on responsible gambling;  
- Weak and ineffective regulation of self-exclusion; and  
- The change from triennial to five-yearly Regulatory Reviews. 
CONCLUSIONS 
The findings of this study of casino employees in a case study of Crown Casino, who 
report on everyday routine practices in the Casino16,  point to a lack of awareness of even 
minimal Crown Code ‗signs‘ of problem gambling and a breakdown in enforcement of 
responsible gambling and responsible service of alcohol within the casino environment. 
Staff are given contradictory messages in an ‗upward report-to-supervisor‘ process, 
which creates staff confusion and disengagement. The process lacks rigor, centralised 
recording, monitoring or accountability under the Code.  
The research also raises questions about the adequacy of security provisions and the 
impact of intoxicated patrons exiting into the surrounding city fringe precinct, as well as 
the quality of auditing, monitoring and staff training processes by the Operator, the 
Gambling Regulator (VCGR) and Liquor Licensing Regulator (Responsible Alcohol 
Victoria). 
The Ministerial Guidelines on codes of practice are clear. For example: 
                                                 
16The forthcoming publication by Linda Hancock (2010) will report in more detail on this study. 
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Section 14 requires that a code of conduct identify what steps a venue will take, 
where appropriate, to ensure customers are made aware of the passage of time 
(Victorian Auditor General, 2010, p. 26). 
The emphasis on ‗keeping people gambling‘ would appear to be in contravention of this 
requirement. 
With regard to Safety at the venue, staff expressed concerns about fights ‗every night,‘ 
and more fights than indicated by calls to ambulance services, and about patrons‘ use of 
knives and bottles. They talked about the frequency of outbreaks of violence and fights, 
sometimes related to patrons‘ gambling losses, with some staff estimating up to 20 or 30 
fights on busy nights such as Fridays, Saturdays and public holidays. Staff also report that 
security escorts of patrons from the casino are a regular occurrence. 
 
In the absence of a mandatory register of security escorts out of the casino, the level of 
violence (and the need for more staff and ramped-up prevention) is hard to estimate. The 
level of violence and its relationship to alcohol and gambling needs further independent 
investigation, but what is clear is that staff are concerned about violence at Crown Casino 
and that this is a real issue for them in their daily work. 
With regard to Training, questions might be raised as to the thoroughness and probity of 
the training and Crown‘s role as an accredited training agent. 
The code is a voluntary code (or as discussed earlier, a ‗hybrid‘ mandatory code) 
approved by the Regulator and is couched in vague terms – for example, ‗encourages 
staff‘ to engage with customers and ‗referral to supervisors‘. This leaves the average 
person wondering about the protocols for such referrals, the frequency and outcomes of 
referrals, the transparency of implementation, staff training on responsible gambling 
interventions (for example, role plays and regular training top-ups to assist staff in the 
identification of signs of risk and harm among patrons), and the outcomes in terms of 
protecting problem gamblers as part of ‗responsible gambling‘ practices. From a 
regulatory perspective, there is no external or independent compliance monitoring of the 
Crown Code and no way of checking these practices. 
Underpinning the Crown Casino Responsible Gambling Code is a model of informed 
choice. This relies on information-provision as the basis for patrons then making an 
‗informed choice‘ to gamble17. It then follows under this model that the patron is 
responsible, should gambling result in harm. Importantly, this model differs markedly 
from a public health and consumer protection model, which is focused a priori, on 
ensuring product safety and safe gambling environments with proactive protective 
interventions when patrons lose control18. The key problem for the informed choice 
                                                 
17 Informed choice principles have guided the production and provision of industry information materials as 
primary prevention initiatives designed to meet the mandate of consumer protection. Brochures, signage, 
web-based information, information programs and other materials promoting responsible gambling 
practices are available in a range of languages (Australasian Casino Association, 2009, p. 15). 
18 See Hancock and O‘Neill (2010) for an elaborated discussion of the informed choice and public 
health/consumer protection models. 
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model is that when gamblers enter ‗the gambling zone‘ and lose control, they lose the 
capacity for rational choice (Dickerson 2004)19.  
Regulation can be seen on a spectrum stretching across two dimensions: first, autonomy 
of process, and second, responsibility for outcome. Normally we would expect those who 
are at the self-regulation end of the process dimension to be at the total responsibility end 
of the outcome spectrum. The opposite would be true if the Government took direct 
charge of the processes. However, in the case of Crown, and in the context of ‗soft‘ or 
‗light-touch‘ government regulation, we appear to have highly autonomous self-
regulation of an operator, which takes questionable responsibility for the outcomes it 
facilitates, and a benign regulator. 
As a self-regulatory system, Crown Casino‘s is reliant on its workers to effectively 
identify problem gamblers and initiate interventions, albeit in an ‗upward report to 
supervisor‘ model. Hence, interviewing workers gives valuable insight into what actually 
happens ‗on the floor‘ and how the Codes of Conduct work in practice. 
The findings point to systemic failure of ‗light touch‘ regulation on responsible gambling 
and responsible service of alcohol in the casino environment where it is left largely to the 
operator to enforce responsible behaviour with no transparent regulatory monitoring of 
performance on codes of conduct, which themselves fall short of best practice. 
The research raises broader issues concerning the role of the state in regulating gambling 
and casino gambling in particular. Since land-based gambling products are embedded in 
gambling venue environments – often alongside sale of alcohol – it can reasonably be 
argued that public interest regulation demands more vigilant monitoring and scrutiny of 
intersecting gambling and liquor licensing regulation than other more benign or less 
potentially harmful forms of ‗entertainment‘. A re-assessment is needed of whether 
‗public interest‘ is sufficiently protected under current approaches to regulation, in the 
context of known potential harms.  
The overall conclusion is one of both Operator and Regulatory failure on responsible 
gambling, as the shift in legislative purpose from promotion of tourism, economic 
development and employment to that of responsible gambling is not reflected in either 
operator or regulator approaches to responsible gambling. The study raises questions as to 
whether state governments with a vested interest in gambling-derived tax revenues have 
too great a conflict of interest to regulate in the public interest, and whether the 
Commonwealth should intervene to re-regulate gambling on matters such as a national 
player protection code of practice for casinos. 
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Deakin University make any warranty or guarantee regarding the contents of the report, and any 
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